

## Massive Multitenancy with V8 Isolates

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# The Challenge

**CLOUDFLARE** 165 Locations and growing Scalability can mean...

# Easy: More locations = more capacity.



# Tenants (apps)

Hard: Every tenant in every location. Some locations are small!





## I, Kenton Varda, made or led:


- Protobufs v2
- Cap'n Proto
- Sandstorm.io
- Cloudflare Workers


Warning - I am **not**:
An experienced speaker
A graphics designer





**App Code Footprint** VM: 10GB Container: 100MB Needed: < 1MB







Startup Time VM: 10s Container: 500ms Needed: < 5ms

#### Other use cases



#### Big Data Processing Run code where the data lives.



#### Web Browsers

Run code from visited sites.

#### WAIT, HOLD UP



We built this already!

Browsers are optimized for...

# **Small downloads**

# **Fast startup**

O Many tabs and frames



# Secure Isolation



V8 JavaScript Runtime: An Extreme Multitenancy Engine

## Isolates and APIs

**class** v8::Isolate

VMs	Containers	Isolates
Application	Application	Application
		Uncommon libraries
Libraries	Libraries	Web Platform APIs
Language Runtime	Language Runtime	JS Runtime
Operating System	Operating System	Operating System
Hardware (virtualized)	Hardware	Hardware

Provided by host

Provided by guest

# **Standard APIs**

HTTP client: Fetch API HTTP server: Service Workers

```
addEventListener('fetch', event => {
    event.respondWith(handleRequest(event.request))
})
```

```
async function handleRequest(request) {
    // Redirect .jpeg requests to static file server.
    let url = new URL(request.url);
    if (url.pathname.endsWith(".jpeg")) {
        url.host = "static.example.com";
        return fetch(new Request(url, request));
    } else {
        return fetch(request);
    }
}
```

## WebAssembly?




WASM		Isolates
	Application	
	Language Libraries	
	Language Runtime	Application
	API Bindings	Uncommon libraries
	Web Platform APIs	Web Platform APIs
	JS Runtime	JS Runtime
	Operating System	Operating System
	Hardware	Hardware

Missing a way to share common runtimes...

## Resource Management

# OOM Killing as a First Resort



Prioritize: LRU, high memory usage

#### **Resource limits**

Isolates run on separate threads.

# CPU

timer\_create(CLOCK\_THREAD\_CPUTIME\_ID)


isolate.TerminateExecution()



Monitor with isolate.GetHeapStatistics()

Evict isolates that go over limit.

#### Code Distribution







#### Is V8 secure enough for servers?

## V8 bugs...

Deep in v8/src/compiler/typer.cc...

case BuiltinFunctionId::kMathExpm1:
 return Type::Union(Type::PlainNumber(), Type::NaN(), t->zone());

Optimizer: "Math.expm1() can return real number or NaN."

Forgot: -0 (negative zero)

#### Full sandbox breakout!

Awesome writeup: Google "Andrea Biondo V8 bug"

Link: <u>https://abiondo.me/2019/01/02/exploiting-math-expm1-v8/</u>

# NOTHING IS "SECURE" Security is **Risk Management**



Relatively more bugs than VMs.

Reasons:

- Larger attack surface (Bad)
- More research (Good)
  - Bug Bounty
  - Fuzzing
  - Important target





Install updates fast.



Install updates fast.

Install updates faster.



Install updates fast.

Use separate profiles for trusted vs "suspicious" sites.

Install updates faster.



Browser


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Use separate profiles for trusted vs "suspicious" sites.

Server


Install updates faster.

Use separate processes for trusted vs. "suspicious" tenants.




Server

Browser



Server


Store all scripts ever uploaded for forensic purposes. No eval().



#### Server

Store all scripts ever uploaded for forensic purposes. No eval().

Watch for segfaults, inspect scripts that cause them.



#### Server


Store all scripts ever uploaded for forensic purposes. No eval().

Watch for segfaults, inspect scripts that cause them.

Browser

... can't, privacy violation.

#### What about Spectre?



#### Spectre is here to stay An analysis of side-channels and speculative execution

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
February 15, 2019

discovered that untrusted code can construct a universal read gadget to read all memory in the same address space through side-channels. In the face of this reality, we have shifted the security model of the Chrome web browser and V8 to process isolation.

be separated from the state that triggers the optimization, forcing the optimization to repeatedly occur. **Impossibility of complete mitigation with timers.** Based on the generality argument, we argue that mitigating timing channels by manipulating timers is impossible, nonsensical, and in any case ultimately self-defeating. For example, a common thought is that perhaps the  $\mu$ -architecture can track all time that has been saved due to optimizations and somehow charge the program back. To see why this We have no solution except process isolation.




We can neither confirm nor deny that process isolation is enough.



#### We have tools nobody else has...







No (local) timers (at all!) No (local) concurrency

Freedom to reschedule

# Big Picture

# Units of Compute

Granularity

Mainframe

Commodity Server

Virtual Machine

Container

Isolate



#### **Questions?**